Five fueled-sphere assemblies similar to those proposed for use in the multihundred-watt radioisotope thermoeleitric generator were subjected to conditions simulating earth impacc after orbital abort. Of the five, one had no visible cracks, two had superficial cracks whose penetration of the iridium containment shell was not verified by metallography, one was obviously ruptured, and the fuel of one was exposed.
INTRODUCTION
Because of the emergence of the modular multihundred-watt (MHW) radioisotope thermoelectric generator (RTG) as a power source for spacecraft, and because of increased concern over possible environmental contamination by radioactive material, a sequential test plan 1 for evaluating RTG containment capability was concieved. The plan was designed to simulate, with live fuel, an orbital phase abort resulting in atmospheric reenty of the generator, followed by earth i npact and exposure of its components.
The MHW RTG heat source contains 24 individual fueled-sphere assemblies (FSAs). Each FSA is a PuO 2 sphere, about 37.21 mm (1.45-1.48 in.) in diameter, encapsulated in a vented postimpact containment shell (PICS) of 0. 51-mm (0.020-in. )-thick iridium* that is, in turn, enclosed in an 11.81-mm (0.465-in. )-thick graphite impact shell (GIS) of carbon-impregnated Thornel yarn. ** The 24 FSAs are assembled into an aeroshell that provides basic protection for the heat source during reentry. The postreentry remains of the aeroshell and the GIS protect the individual FSAs during impact and leave the noble-metal PICS of each postimpact sphere assembly (PISA) to contain the plutonia until the debris can be recovered. For practical purposes, therefore, the PSA was selected for impact testing.
*This specification was superseded. The present dimension is 0.56-0.71 mm (0.022-0.028 in.). **A product of Union Carbide Corp., Carbon Products Div., Greenville, SC. II. PROCEDURES Implementation of the test plan shown in Fig. 1 included the following operations. * Figure 2 shows the GIS temperature profile in the LASL gun calculated to give a PICS temperature equal to the average profile of all the PICS in a generator. described in the literature. The welding facilities are described briefly in the section on impact testing.
Special equipment was provided for FSA aging, impact testing, and disassembly. These items and their application to the test program are described briefly in the sections on those subjects.
IV. AGING
The thermal experience of an FSA during orbital abort was simulated by a heat treatment at 1268°C, measured on the GIS surface, for 2. 6 Ms *To facilitate the vent check, it was agreed that the PISA would be removed from the impact shell. could be charged without exposure to air. The glovebox also served as a place in which to open shipping containers and store assemblies. Four FSAs were aged at a time. During the aging, the pressure in the furnace chamber approximated 1.3 x 10"* Pa (1 x 10" 6 torr).
V. IMPACT TESTING
The ground impact of a reentering FSA was simulated by using a gas gun to fire it against a granite target at 74.7-78.0 m/s (245-256 fps). A vertical gas gun with an impact chamber, residualenergy absorbing equipment, gas supply, and the necessary instrumentation provided these conditions Features oi the gun tube and the projectile are shown in Figs. 4-6. The test specimen, shown in Fig. 6 , was enclosed in a tantalum container to keep the gun from being contaminated with plutonia. The 0.75-mm (0.030-in.)-thick tantalum container, which also served as a susceptor to heat the specimen electronically during the reentry pulse, was closed by welding with an inert tungsten arc. (The welding was done in an argon-filled enclosure, but the gas was evacuated from the impact can before the test.) A catch tube inside the impact chamber of the gun received the canned specimen. The catch tube became a sealed container as part of the projectile was driven into its tapered port, and it was later detached from the gun to be used n transporting the test body to the next station for disassembly. The impact can velocity was monitored by means of an array of shorting pins in the gun muzzle. The specimen temperature was evaluated by a thermocouple in contact with the impact can. Table V Note that the tests involved only single KSAs. Therefore, the results of the tests that did not include impact can be applied to the FSAs in a heat source. They may not, however, be so applied when impact is involved, because the degree of fuel disintegration is a function of containment deformation which varies with location within the heat 9 source.
VII.
POSTTEST EXAMINATION A.
FSA 28. FSA 28 was withdrawn from the test after short-term aging, in accordance with the test plan in Fig. 1 . As-received radiography indicated that the plutonia had been fractured badly by vibration anc! shipping and that the fuel sphere was broken. 1 he assembly <vas not radiographed after aging.
The GIS exterior seemed unaffected by aging. Internally, a small pit with a white halo was found in a location corresponding to one of the vents. The PISA was clean arid bright, except that one vent had a black incrustation of iridium with some tungsten and oxygen.
The PICS inte. .or was heavily coated with chemical-vapor deposited (CVD) plutonia. Both vents were closed to helium by the effects of sintering in the frit and deposition of plutonia and a second nonmetallic material containing mostly calcium, silicon, and oxygen, also in the frit. However, no swelling of the PICS was detected.
The iridium grains were of mixed sizes, the diameter of ihe largest being equal to the thickness of the PICS wall. There were also large grains in the closure w»ld. Both of these conditions provided short boundary paths, susceptible to fracturing, across the PICS wall. However, no mechanical defects were seen in the shell.
The plutonis had fractured into large pieces with relatively few fines. Its grains were ~ 50 fjm in diameter, and the pore volumes at the pole, equator, and middle were 17, 11, and 23%, respectively. FSA 25. FSA 25 was examined after vibration, aging, and reentry. Initial radiography had indicated that the plutonia was badly cracked and the sphere broken after vibration and shipping. After aging, the GIS seemed unaffected, and the fuel sphere had deteriorated further,. A vent check was positive (at least one vent was open), and the FSA was reentered.
When the GIS was opened and the PISA removed, a crack about 2 mm long was found in the closure weld. Both vents were later found to be closed to helium, so it is presumed that the positive vent check was really a result of the fracture.
After testing, the PICS interior was heavily coated with vapor-deposited plutonia and some iridium. The iridium grain size approximated the wall thickness, and straight-through grain boundaries were characteristic both there and in the weld. The fracture mentioned above was intergranular and had progres .ed through such a boundary. The iridium microhardness and impurity content were normal, except for the silicon content which was slightly hii»h. The vents were closed by the effects of sintering and CVD plutonia in the frit.
The plutonia had fractured into many mediumsize pieces. Its grains were 40-80 (itn in diameter. Pore volumes at the pole, equator, and middle were 10, 10, and 17%, respectively. C.
FSA 26. FSA 26 was the first FSA to be impacted. Initial radiography had indicated that the plutonia was not an intact sphere after vibration and shipping. The FSA was not radiographed after aging. After aging, the GIS exterior seemed unaffected. There was a sn.all pit with a white halo on the inside of the cap. The PISA, including the vents, was clean and bright, and a vent check was positve.
Accidental impact on the edge of the cap crushed the GIS badly and deformed the PISA asymmetrically. There were no visible ruptures in the PICS, but at least one fingerprint-type crack in the impact face penetrated the containment wall.
The fracture was intergranular. Maximum iridium grain size again approximated wall thickness in both hemishells and in the closure weld. The vents were closed tc helium after impact by the effects of sintering and CVD plufoni.a in the frits.
The plutonia had deformed by plastic flow and was broken into many medium-size pieces. Its grain diameters were 40 to 50 jjm, and pore volumes at the pole, equator, and middle were 11, 12, and 35%, respectively. D.
FSA 27. FSA 27 was the second FSA impacted and the first to be environmentally exposed. Initial radiography had indicated that the plutonia was not an intact sphere after vibration and shipping. The FSA was not radiographed Again after aging.
After aging, the GIS was clean and bright. Internally, a small pit with a white halo occurred in the cap, presumably at a vent site. The PISA, including both vents, was also clean and i.right. A vent check by helium release was positive.
Impact was 180° from the GIS cap, as intended. The GIS body was not split, but, in addition tc having a crushed cone of material in the impact face, it delaminated when removed from Che impact can. The PISA was evenly deformed. There appeared to be a small crack about 3 mm long 1:1 a fold in the impact face at the edge of a plutonia fragment. Shell penetration, however, had not been verified when the PISA was placed in the environmental chamber.
The PISA was recovered for examination after 1-yr exposure to periodic rain and drying. During the first rain, it sank into the soil to about nine tenths of its height, probably because of cavitation in the loose soil. As the soil became compacted, settling ceased.
The exposed PISA surface was covered by a scale deposited as the rain evaporated. The buried part had a thick coating of loosely bonded soil particles. The soil had not fused. Aside from the superficial coatings, the PICS was unaffected by exposure. ISA ao. FSA 30 was ihe third FSA impacted. Initial radiography had indicated that the plutonia was no longer an intact sphere after vibration and shipping. However, no further deterioration was seen during aging.
Impact was 180° from the GIS cap. The graphite body was not split, but a cone of material in the impact face was crushed and there was some delamination of the rap. The PISA was evenly deformed. A iingerprint pattern of short cracks occurred in ihe impact face, but metallography did not verify penetration of the iridium shell.
At disassembly, ihe PICS interior was heavily coated with CVO ulutonia. A vent in the impact face was closed to helium by a combination of sintering* and C'VD plutonia ,-lus a second nonmetallic phase in the frit which contained mostly calcium, silicon, ami oxygen. Indium impurities were at a normal level.
The niutonia had fractured mostly into relatively small fragments. Grain diameters varied from 40 to flO jjiri at the equator to the original particle <is.e at a pole and at the middle. Pore volumes at the pole, equator, and middle were 14, 4, and 16%, respectively. The plutonia appeared to have been substoichiometric wiih respect to oxygen at some time during its thermal history, thereby allowing partitioning to occur, (See Fig. 34 , See. VIII.} Its <i.\ygen:mutal ration determined by thermogravimetric analysis, was 1.95. F.
FSA 31.
FSA 31 was the fou. th FSA impacted and the second environmentally exposed. Initial radiography had indicated that the plutonia was badly cracked but still intact. No further deterioration was apparent after agi.ig.
After aging, the GIS was clean and bright. Its interior was dull but had no detectable pits. The *Sintering is considered to be a factor in vent failure. H was not established, however, whether the varying degree of sintering observed occurred when the filter was made or during aging, for example. PISA, including both ven's, was also clean and bright. A vent check by helium release was positive.
Impact was 180° from the GIS cap. The graphite body was split. Its cap had been crushed and delaminated. The PISA deformed evenly, although the effect of large fuel fragments was visible.
TensOe ruptures about 2 mm long occurred in the PICS periphery and along a reentrant fold in the impact face at the edges of large fuel fragments. The PISA was buried 0. 229 m (9 in.) deep in dry soil for 5. 8 Ms (67 days) before further examination.
Surface thermocouples showed a PICS temperature of 1135-115O*C during the environmental test. When recovered, the PISA had a thick coating of fused soil particles. Where the fused material was continuous and in intimate contact with the iridium, no ercsion took place. The soil coating, however, was fissured, and there the iridium was so eroded that the wall was often perforated. Analysis of residual nonmetallic material in the erosion sites showed it to be an oxide of iridium, and the erosion mechanisms to be oxidation and vapor transport. There was no evidence of reaction between soil and tridium.
Chemical analysis of the fused soil showed that it contained 0.03 wt% plutonium. Assuming a shell thickness of 5 mm and a sintered density of 2, the weight of plutonia released was 0.02 g. G.
FSA 29. FSA 29 Iiad been held as a replacement in case one of the first six assemblies was accidentally destroyed. With completion of the six tests, SNS agreed that it be impacted at the lowest credible temperature rather than used to supplement a preceding test.
Initial radiography had indicated that the plutonia was no longer an intact sphere. After aging, the impact shell seemed unaffected both internally and externally. The PISA, including both vents, was clean and bright. A vent check by helium release was positive. 100-1000/ 100-1000 <SO0/<300 10-100/10/ 100 lo-ioo/io-100 100-1000/ 300-3000 < 100/< 100 6946  1414  0732  0244  0183  0064  0130  0136  0033  0080  0031  0008   000435  000029  000040  000095  000085  000035  000058  000030  000024  000006 Electron microprobe analyses show that this material contains mostly calcium, silicon, and oxygen with magnesium or aluminum and. sometimes, plulonium.
e The analyses a: 3 from both hemisbells. impurities selected are those having the greatest concentration or showing the greatest variation. f The values are approximations of actual grain size, not from an intercept, so they are based on the large grains unless mire than one range is evident, g Pore volumes were determined from photomicrographs at 100 X by Quamimet (Image Analyzing Computer, Ltd., Cambridge, England). h Thermogravimetric analyses were made after storing the plutonia in air for several days, i X-ray diffraction analyses were made after storage in air.
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VHI. PHOTOGRAPHIC DOCUMENTATION
Effects observed during the test series were photographed whenever practicable. However, because of the similarity of the specimens and test conditions, the effects differed mostly in degree. Pig. 22. Sintering and vapor deposition of plutonia in a frit is shown m this section of FSA 26. X 500. Sintering occurred generally throughout the frit, whereas the plutonia was deposited mostly between the shield and fritted disk near the hole in the shield. FSA 30. X 100. The material appearr to have an oxygen:metal ratio of 1. 85, but the actual ratio was 1. 39. It is presumed to have been deficient in oxygen at some time during its thermal history when partitioning took place; then it was oxidized to P11O2 but retained a metastable ghost of its former state.
IX.
RESULTS
The initial damage that affected the SST outcome occurred early in the history of each FSA. Radiography at Mound Laboratory revealed severe plutonia cracking after the vibration phase, although it may have occurred even earlier. Large fragments of fviel present during impact strained the containment shell of two, or possibly three, units to failure where the material stretched over their projecting ed^es. The fuel disintegrated further in subsequent thermal treatments, but this did not appear to affect the outcome.
Grain growth in the iridium often progressed to the extent that (he shell wall was only one grain thick. Because the failures seen in the iridium were essentially intergranular, these short, direct, boundary paths increased the susceptibility to fracturing. However, this defect was serious n only one instance. As it would have entailed destructive testing, we did not determine the phase in which the growth occurred. Probably all three high-temperature phases, welding, heat treatment, and aging contributed. Evidently, as it was not confined to heat-affected zones, the growth did not occur during welding alone.
Vent failure usually resulted from a combination 'if iridium frit sintering, transport of plutonia to the frit, and the presence in the frit of a nonmatallic material that contained calcium, silicon, and oxygen and, sometimes, plutonium, iron, and magnesium or aluminum. We do not know the source of this material. Its major constituents are impurities normally found in ihe iridium, bul the plutonia seems a more probable source. Vapor trar.sport of iridium from the weld shields to the PICS seemed not to affect the vents. There was no evidence that ihe thermal treatments degraded the iriuium by reaction with either plutonia or graphite.
Plutonia mhomogeneity was another bad condition, bin, again, specific effects cannot be ascribed to it. Perhaps it contributed to iridium failure by influencing the size of fragments present at impact, or contributed to formation of fingerprint cracking in the impact face. This crack pattern results from hard fuel, but the location of the densest zone (usually the equatorial zone) relative to the impact face is not known.
The primary objective of the test series was to evaluate the capability of the hardware to contain plutonia, which it did very well. No significant amount of plutonia escaped into the aging furnace. After aging, the junction of the impact sphere cap and body gave an alpha swipe count of about 200/min. Some internal alpha counts exceeded 100 000/min, but the contamination was essentially confined within the GIS. The SVT* indicates that release of milligram quantities of plutonia from impacted assemblies certainly would lave occurred in one instance (FSA 29) and in two instances (FSA 29 and 31) at most.
